Originally published in 1920, this collection of essays presents and discusses some of the principal subjects addressed in the Report of the Committee on Adult Education in 1919. The authors examine topics such as women and adult education, and the democratic foundations and implications of further education for those past school-leaving age. One essay is written by an adult student from Southport who is a self-described 'working-man'. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the history (...) of education. (shrink)

A number of ways of taxonomizing human learning have been proposed. We examine the evidence for one such proposal, namely, that there exist independent explicit and implicit learning systems. This combines two further distinctions, (1) between learning that takes place with versus without concurrent awareness, and (2) between learning that involves the encoding of instances (or fragments) versus the induction of abstract rules or hypotheses. Implicit learning is assumed to involve unconscious rule learning. We examine the evidence for implicit learning (...) derived from subliminal learning, conditioning, artificial grammar learning, instrumental learning, and reaction times in sequence learning. We conclude that unconscious learning has not been satisfactorily established in any of these areas. The assumption that learning in some of these tasks (e.g., artificial grammar learning) is predominantly based on rule abstraction is questionable. When subjects cannot report the rules that govern stimulus selection, this is often because their knowledge consists of instances or fragments of the training stimuli rather than rules. In contrast to the distinction between conscious and unconscious learning, the distinction between instance and rule learning is a sound and meaningful way of taxonomizing human learning. We discuss various computational models of these two forms of learning. (shrink)

In the original target article (Shanks & St. John 1994), one of our principal conclusions was that there is almost no evidence that learning can occur outside awareness. The continuing commentaries raise some interesting questions, especially about the definition of learning, but do not lead us to abandon our conclusion.

The relationship between animal ownership and owners' health has received increasing attention in the recent human-companion animal literature. This article considers a new aspect of the human-companion animal relationship, that of compatibility between pet and owner. Compatibility is viewed as the fit between the animal and the owner on physical, behavioral, and psychological dimensions. A postal survey was used to test the hypothesis that compatibility has influences on physical and mental health that are independent of those due to owners' level (...) ofpet attachment and human social support. A sample group of 176 pet owners completed a questionnaire containing a new measure of compatibility as well as standard measures of pet attachment, human social support, and mental and physical health. Results of multiple regression analyses indicated that people who are relatively more compatible with their pets report better mental health overall and fewer physical symptoms. Social support was positively associated with mental health. Pet attachment was also positively associated with mental health, but negatively with physical health. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

Peer review is a widely accepted instrument for raising the quality of science. Peer review limits the enormous unstructured influx of information and the sheer amount of dubious data, which in its absence would plunge science into chaos. In particular, peer review offers the benefit of eliminating papers that suffer from poor craftsmanship or methodological shortcomings, especially in the experimental sciences. However, we believe that peer review is not always appropriate for the evaluation of controversial hypothetical science. We argue that (...) the process of peer review can be prone to bias towards ideas that affirm the prior convictions of reviewers and against innovation and radical new ideas. Innovative hypotheses are thus highly vulnerable to being “filtered out” or made to accord with conventional wisdom by the peer review process. Consequently, having introduced peer review, the Elsevier journal Medical Hypotheses may be unable to continue its tradition as a radical journal allowing discussion of improbable or unconventional ideas. Hence we conclude by asking the publisher to consider re-introducing the system of editorial review to Medical Hypotheses. (shrink)

This is the second and final volume of manuscripts by or relating to Thomas Robert Malthus that are now held at Kanto Gakuen University in Japan. Volume I contains 75 items of correspondence, while Volume II contains transcriptions of further original manuscripts, including: four of Malthus' sermons; his diary of a tour of the Lake District; an extensive set of calculations in the bullion trade, suggesting that he was giving serious thought to becoming a bullion trader on his own account; (...) lecture notes on European history from the fifth to the tenth century; his wife's diary of their holiday in Scotland in 1826 and an essay on foreign trade. These previously unknown and unpublished manuscripts promise insights into his intellectual development and the events and circumstances of his life, as well as glimpses of the lifestyle of his wider family and contemporaries. (shrink)

The problem of doctrinal development, first formulated by John Henry Newman, is usually assumed to be a distinctly modern theological issue, since itoriginates in modern scholarly history and its application to problems of doctrine. My thesis, in contrast, is that St. Bonaventure’s theology of history as presentedin his Hexaemeron is also a theory of doctrinal development—though it appears some six hundred years prior to Newman’s Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. I begin by discussing the relationship between theology (...) of history and doctrinal development, from which I conclude Bonaventure’s theology of history is a theory of doctrinal development. Secondly, I discuss Bonaventure’s theory and how he uses it to justify the mendicant and Franciscan ways of life. Finally, I develop elements of Cardinal Newman’s theory as points for comparison and evaluation of Bonaventure’s theory. (shrink)

The life history of certain philosophical and theological terms and concepts constitutes in itself an interesting matter for consideration and reflection. None is more interesting than that of natural law. Many studies have traced the development of natural law philosophy from its early precursors among the Pre-Socratics through Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics, St Thomas, and the early British empiricists; have noted its demise in the nineteenth century, largely as a result of the criticism of Hume; and have observed its (...) renaissance in the twentieth century. Despite this undeniable revival of interest in the theory in the present century, a moral philosopher uses the term only at great risk, for no philosophical theory has been so vigorously attacked and so thoroughly ‘refuted’ as natural law. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of essays by various contributors in honor of the late Laurence Berns, Richard Hammond Elliot Tutor Emeritus at St. John's College, Annapolis. The essays address the literary, political, theological, and philosophical themes of his life's work as a scholar, teacher, and constant companion of the "great books.".

Clarembald of Arras, a twelfth-century ecclesiastical official and schoolmaster, composed glosses on two of the Boethian Opuscula Sacra and a commentary on the hexameron. While he acknowledged his study of Boethius under his masters Thierry of Chartres and Hugh of St. Victor, his dependence on the former is significant: he borrowed heavily from Thierry, following not only his basic doctrinal interpretation of the Boethian treatises but also repeating entire passages from Thierry's glosses. ;The question arises then: is Clarembald to be (...) considered as nothing more than an imitator of the thought of Thierry? Is he to be understood simply as a "typical Chartrian"? Is his interest in the Boethian opuscula confined to restatements of Thierry's interpretations and entirely lacking in any other purposes or qualities that are peculiarly his own? ;A careful reading of the Clarembaldian corpus does indeed present a strong case for the dependence of Clarembald upon Thierry in thought and expression. Yet he composed his De Trinitate gloss at the request of others, even though Thierry's was available, indicating something of Clarembald's standing in the academic community. Further there is substantial evidence in his writings of a distinct measure of independence from Thierry. This is to be found in part in Clarembald's careful contextualization of each work and again in his utilization of sources unknown to Thierry. The most prominent feature of independence is found in Clarembald's intention or purpose in writing his own glosses and the hexameron: Clarembald's works have a certain polemical and apologetic orientation, particularly in regard to Gilbert of Poitiers, Peter Abelard and the Cathars, an orientation not found as such in Thierry's works. ;A careful examination of the texts shows Clarembald to be indeed a scholar of some merit in his research and in the expression of his thought. His intentions and purposes in writing go beyond an imitation of Thierry: he used the glosses to confront dogmatic issues of the day, giving him his own unique place in the tradition of Boethian commentators and in the intellectual history of the middle ages. (shrink)

Throughout much of this century the most prominent exegetes maintained that Aquinas’s mature moral psychology is fundamentally voluntarist, that he considers the will an independent cause of action, most conspicuously in his later works. Disagreement over the character of the will’s causal authority and the composition of the list of later works did little to unsettle their shared conviction that Aristotle’s intellectualist moral psychology was improved, indeed saved, by Aquinas’s insistence that the will can move itself, at least in some (...) fashion, apart from the influence of the intellect. See Rene Antoine Gauthier and Jean Yves Jolif, Aristote: L’éthique à Nicomaque, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1970), p. 218; Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. J.P. Burns (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), pp. 93–97; Odom Lottin, “La Preuve de al Liberté Humaine chez Saint Thomas d’Aquin,” Recherches de Theologie Ancienne et Medievale 23 (1956): 323–30; and Klaus Riesenhuber, Die Transzendenz Der Freiheit Zum Guten: Der Wille in der Anthropologie und Metaphysik des Thomas von Aquin (Munchen: Berchmanskolleg Verlag, 1971), p. 290. (shrink)

In a pluralistic society such as ours, tolerance is a virtue -- but it doesn't always seem so. Some suspect that it entangles us in unacceptable moral compromises and inequalities of power, while others dismiss it as mere political correctness or doubt that it can safeguard the moral and political relationships we value. Tolerance among the Virtues provides a vigorous defense of tolerance against its many critics and shows why the virtue of tolerance involves exercising judgment across a variety of (...) different circumstances and relationships -- not simply applying a prescribed set of rules. Drawing inspiration from St. Paul, Aquinas, and Wittgenstein, John Bowlin offers a nuanced inquiry into tolerance as a virtue. He explains why the advocates and debunkers of toleration have reached an impasse, and he suggests a new way forward by distinguishing the virtue of tolerance from its false look-alikes, and from its sibling, forbearance. Some acts of toleration are right and good, while others amount to indifference, complicity, or condescension. Some persons are able to draw these distinctions well and to act in accord with their better judgment. When we praise them as tolerant, we are commending them as virtuous. Bowlin explores what that commendation means. Tolerance among the Virtues offers invaluable insights into how to live amid differences we cannot endorse -- beliefs we consider false, actions we think are unjust, institutional arrangements we consider cruel or corrupt, and persons who embody what we oppose. (shrink)

Peter Geach has claimed that St. Thomas Aquinas's first and second ways are instances of composition arguments, which argue from the parts of a thing having a property to the whole thing having that property. Such arguments are not universally valid, but are valid fr some properties. The paper examines composition arguments and the literature on them, and argues that a valid composition argument can be given for the existence of an uncaused cause of all effects.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE NON-INFALLIBLE MORAL TEACIDNG OF THE CHURCH T:HE CHURCH has always claimed the authority to each in the name of Christ. This authority is given to he Pope and to the Bishops in union with him. It is their duty to hand on the Christian message and keep it intact. The duty of the rest of the faithful is to follow this teaching. The Latin term used to express (...) this following is obsequium religiosum.1 This is not an easy term to translate into English but in general it has been taken to mean religious assent. The use of the word assent implies that it is the human intellect that is engaged. Following Church teaching is not just a matter of obedience to a superior or observance of law, that is, of acting in a manner in accord with some precept or legislation. Obedience and observance are basically a matter of the will and external execution of a command but do not necessarily imply intellectual engagement, at least on the level of assent. It is quite true that if obedience or observance are to be human acts at all, there must be an understanding of what is commanded. But it is possible to observe a law or command without agreeing with it. And it is execution primarily that obedience and observance of law call for. If one does what is commanded either by an authority or by law, he is fulfilling his basic obligation. He may or may not agree with the command given. In other words intellectual assent is not in itself the response called for by this kind of authority. In fact, intellectual assent as such is not and cannot be required by law. When it is given, it is the magis.2 1 Vatican II, The Church, n. 25. Documents of Vatican II, Austin Flannery, O.P. (New York: Costello, 1975) 379. 2 For a full treatment of intellectual obedience see the letter on the virtue of obedience of St. Ignatius Loyola, especially n. 9 ff. Rules of the Society of Jesus, (Woodstock: Woodstock Press, 1956) 65 ff. I 2 JOHN R. CONNERY, S.J. We do not mean to imply that agreement with a law or command is irrelevant. There is good reason to believe that continued observance or obedience is intimately related to agreement with a law or precept. Where there is conflict, observance may be very difficult, and may not survive at all. What we are saying is that a precept or a law aims primarily at performance, not at assent. Agreement will indeed be desirable, but as a guarantee of performance. In itself it is not a requirement of obedience or observance. But assent is the proper response to teaching. So teaching differs from a precept or a law in this respect. Obedience or observance is the response to the latter, and these may be given with or without intellectual assent. But when one is dealing with teaching, assent is called for. From the above it is clear that in claiming the authority to teach, the Church is claiming a power which even civil governments do not claim. Civil government has ruling or governing power; it makes no claim to teaching authority. So it cannot require intellectual assent to its demands. And the same is true of other human organizations, even those of a religious nature. Authorities in them may have ruling or governing power of some kind, but this is the limit of their authority. There are, of course, many teachers in our world. Anyone who imparts information or knowledge to another is a teacher. Ordinarily, however, the title is reserved to those who have a certain competence in the field in which they teach and are teachers by profession. The claim of the Church goes beyond this kind of teaching, even when the teaching is in the area of theology. It is the claim to teach in the name of Christ.3 This makes the teaching of the Church different from other teaching. It must be admitted that when one is dealing with teaching, especially moral teaching, more than an intellectual response is called for. Assent to teaching must... (shrink)

For Max Scheler, St. Francis represented perhaps the highest ideal of the moral life, an ideal he felt compelled to articulate throughout his philosophical work. In this paper, I examine the significance of the person of St. Francis for Scheler’s philosophy. I begin by developing Scheler’s notion of “exemplary person,” the idea that persons act as influences on moral life and thought. I then hypothesize that St. Francis functioned as an exemplary person for Scheler. Finally, I attempt to justify that (...) hypothesis by examining Scheler’s discussion of Francis in Sympathy and by comparing Scheler’s philosophy to elements of the thought of Bonaventure and of Scotus. I conclude with a discussion of the significance of using exemplary persons for understanding the history of philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:16~ BOOK REVIEWS There are fairly frequent typographical errors in the text; most of them harmless hut one of them reverses the meaning of the sentence- " institutionally prescribed means " for " institutionally proscribed means" (p. 279), and a couple of them are comical-" In a previous part of this discussion (pp. 000-000) ", (p. 265); see also p. 274. MICHAEL STOCK, O.P. St. Stephen Priory Dover, Massachusetts (...) Rhetoric and Praxis: The Contribution of Classical Rhetoric to Prac· tical Reasoning. Edited by JEAN DIETZ Moss. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986. Pp. 168. $24.00 (cloth). The six essays on classical rhetoric which constitute this collection were first presented at a conference entitled Classical Rhetoric and the Teaching of Freshman Composition held October 6-8, 1983, at The Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C. In her excellent introduction, Jean Dietz Moss, the editor, indicates that the purpose of this collection of essays is " to retrieve from the classical age of rhetoric some methods of practical reasoning-methods of stimulating and ordering thought about matters of common concern-that might inform our teaching of writing today" (p. 1). This particular theme runs throughout all of the essays. Professor Moss informs us that the basis of these studies is the conviction that the act of reason has not changed since the time of the Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle, even though its forms have. The reasoning process is the same for us today as it was for those of the past. Armed with this conviction, the authors of these essays attempt to recover from classical rhetoric some means which will assist in the teaching of freshman composition. In the initial essay, Professor Schoeck gives the background and history of rhetoric, thus setting the stage for the essays which follow. These essays take up in turn five classical concepts: topoi, enthymeme, kairos, aitia and telos. The first two concepts are the more familiar and are derived from Aristotle's Rhetoric; the other three, while less familiar, are discovered throughout the writings of other philosophers and rhetoricians of the classical period. Professor Hairston focuses even more sharply on the cause of the present problem in writing among students. Hairston explains that early in the twentieth century rhetoric as an academic discipline was separated from the English BOOK REVIEWS 168 departments, and then, within a brief period of time, was dropped from the curriculum altogether. In the absence of rhetoric, the teaching of writing was left entirely to literature departments, and according to Hairston, this was a serious mistake. The romantic view held by most literature departments at that time led them to deal with writing as a nonrational activity. The papers in this collection put forward the view that composing is a cognitive task and training in rhetoric can assist in its development. Schoeck reflects the attitude of all the contributors when he proposes that what is needed now is a rhetoric for our times. " One of our purposes in these essays is to insure that there will be a renewed presentation that will keep pace with contemporary literary production" (p. 38). One must applaud the effort both to improve the writing of com· positions by students and to recover a part of classical rhetoric for our day. This particular effort to recover some of the riches of the past appears to be a part of a growing trend which the reviewer heartily endorses. By and large, this collection of essays is very good. However, a teacher of composition unfamiliar with rhetoric might find its usefulness limited. Although the terminology is defined within the context of the articles, it is my judgment that the essays would be found difficult to understand by one who had little or no previous familiarity with rhetoric. The usefulness of these essays would improve exponentially for someone who came to them equipped with some knowledge of classical rhetoric. None of the articles deals directly with the problem of teaching writing or communication. The participants at the con· ference at which these essays were originally presented had the advan· tage of ongoing discussions from which they were able to develop tactics to be implemented in the... (shrink)

In June 21, 1990, the Joneses, an African-American family living in the mainly white and working-class neighbourhood of St. Paul in Minnesota, saw a small white cross burning in their yard. By placing the burning cross on the yard, the Minnesota Supreme Court argued that one of the accused, Robert A Viktora, had engaged in ‘fighting words’. However, the US Supreme Court reversed this decision, arguing that the local authority in St Paul only legally banned certain ‘fighting words’, but not (...) others. Judith Butler explores this legal case, R.A.V. v. St. Paul. Judith Butler argues in her earlier work that the Supreme Court in effect represented the burning cross as being non-performative and simply a vehicle of expression rather than a historical symbol of hate speech towards African-Americans. In this paper, I look again at the R.A.V. case. But I do so by both drawing on what Butler explicitly says about the case in her early work and integrating this with her later work on the ethics of grief, state hegemony and public assemblies. Furthermore, I also incorporate some of the insights of the Bakhtin Circle into Butler’s work to strengthen her arguments. The paper then revisits R.A.V. v. St. Paul and shows how Reaganite state hegemony effectively transformed issues of racism surrounding this free speech case into ‘monologic’ and ‘ungrievable’ public matters of concern. The paper concludes by briefly discussing counter-hegemonic politics of free speech. (shrink)

This book, first published in 1940, accomplishes three tasks: 1) it gives a lucidly fascinating account of the theology underlying St. Bernard's diagnosis of man's condition and the cure proposed by him--monastic asceticism leading to mystical union; 2) it rectifies misinterpretations of St. Bernard's doctrine of carnal love as the first step to pure love; and 3) it uncovers the major sources of this system of theology: Cicero, Augustine, the Epistle of St. John, Dionysius and the Rule of St. (...) Benedict. The interest of the work is enhanced by appendices on Abelard, on the relation of Cistercian Mysticism to courtly love and on William of Saint-Thierry.--R. G. S. (shrink)

A school of idealism: meditatio laici, by J. Cappon.--Beati possidentes, by R. M. Wenley.--Moral validity: a study in Platonism, by R. C. Lodge.--Plato and the poet's eidōla, by A. S. Ferguson.--Some reflections on Aristotle's theory of tragedy, by G. S. Brett.--The function of the phantasm in St. Thomas Aquinas, by H. Carr.--The development of the psychology of Maine de Biran, by N. J. Symons.--A plea for eclecticism, by H. W. Wright.--Some present-day tendencies in philosophy, by J. M. MacEachran.--Evolution and personality, (...) J. G. Hume.--Emergent realism, by J. Muirhead.--Bibliography of publications by Dr. John Watson (p. 343-346). (shrink)

St. Augustine, pictured by Western painters holding in his hand his heart blazing with passionate love, consistently and repeatedly insisted―from his earliest writings until close to his death―that the essential characteristic of God is “God is love” (1 John 4:16). Yet he also insisted on the doctrines of original sin and everlasting punishment for the massa damnata. This article will not explore the rationale or semantics of his arguments, nor the detail and nuance of the doctrines of predestination and (...) perseverance. Rather, I seek to understand, from Augustine’s last writings, how he reconciled his strong conviction that God is love with doctrines requiring belief in a God who determined the fate of individuals to eternal reward or punishment “before the foundation of the world” (Eph. 1:4), a God indifferent to individuals’ actions, struggles, or longings. My primary interest is not on Augustine’s ability to render these two apparently opposing ideas of God intellectually compatible, but rather on his feeling, gathered from his last sermons, as he approached death. In brief, how could Augustine love the God in whom he believed? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Seductiveness of Virtue: Abraham Joshua Heschel and John Paul II on Morality and Personal Fulfillment by John J. FitzgeraldMatthew R. PetrusekThe Seductiveness of Virtue: Abraham Joshua Heschel and John Paul II on Morality and Personal Fulfillment John J. Fitzgerald new york: bloomsbury t&t clark, 2017. 240 pp. $114The Seductiveness of Virtue offers a close study of the twentieth-century Polish-American rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel, (...) and the first Polish pope, St. John Paul II, on the relationship between being good and being happy. Overall the book advances the conversation on the meaning and continued relevance of virtue in contemporary ethics, though its eagerness to build bridges across competing religious and philosophical traditions opens the argument to both methodological and substantive criticisms. [End Page 206]Fitzgerald divides the book into an introduction and four chapters. Chapter 1, "The Meaning of Our Question," establishes the definitions of concepts that Fitzgerald addresses throughout the rest his argument, including "happiness," "meaning," "freedom," "personal fulfillment," "good and evil," and "doing." Fitzgerald locates each term within the theologies of Heschel and John Paul II and provides his own definitions. Chapter 2, "Heschel and the 'Joys of Mitsvah,'" enters more deeply into Heschel's theology, arguing that, despite some ambiguity about whether morality will always lead to personal fulfillment, Heschel establishes a firm theological and practical connection between following the law (mitzvah) and being happy. Chapter 3, "John Paul II and the Good We Must Do to Have Eternal Life," engages in a similar analysis of John Paul's thought (including his writings before becoming pope) and, despite using different theological categories (chief among them "Christ"), arrives at a similar conclusion: there is a necessary connection between being good and being happy. Chapter 4, which also functions as a conclusion, places the comparison between Heschel and John Paul into a wider comparative context, examining how their respective conclusions on morality and the good relate to insights from other contemporary perspectives, including the Dalai Lama, Peter Singer, and present-day "positive psychology." Fitzgerald concludes by offering five reasons why it is important to continue, in his words, an "interworldview" and "interdisciplinary" dialogue on how virtue relates to happiness.The book is richly sourced—containing 199 footnotes, bibliography, and detailed index—and serves as a good addition to the libraries of those working on John Paul II, Abraham Heschel, virtue theory, or comparative ethics more broadly. Yet its breadth on the comparative front also highlights its vulnerabilities, particularly on the question of what defines the relationship between virtue and happiness from a normative perspective. While providing lucid descriptive accounts of different conceptions of God and the good, for example, Fitzgerald acknowledges near the book's conclusion, "whether one finds [any] author persuasive will depend in large part on one's prior conclusions about the existence and nature of God and the afterlife" (184) and notes that this topic "cannot be resolved or even explored here" (185). However, these "prior conclusions" themselves are ultimately most meaningful for answering the book's central question.This reticence to engage in meta-ethical questions also leads the text to a problematic epistemological and ethical equalizing of each perspective, one that allows Fitzgerald to claim, for example, "while there is much common ground between Heschel, John Paul II, and [Peter] Singer on the relationship between morality and fulfillment, there are also key differences" (174). Here Fitzgerald understates the contrast: one of the "key" differences between Singer's utilitarian materialism and John Paul II's gospel of life is that Singer's position could serve as a paradigmatic representation of the "culture of death" [End Page 207] that John Paul spent his papacy resisting. Thus, while providing an excellent analysis of each thinker individually, the book's argument would benefit from establishing a firmer and more transparent standard for evaluating ethical claims across traditions.Matthew R. PetrusekLoyola Marymount UniversityCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

In his last years, St. Augustine became impatient with the doctrinal questions and requests for advice on practical matters of ecclesiastical discipline frequently referred to in correspondence of his last decade. Scholars have often attributed his uncharacteristic reluctance to address these matters to the diminishing competence and energy of old age. This article demonstrates that his evident unwillingness to respond at length to such queries relates rather to his desire to sequester increased time for meditation. Throughout his Christian life, he (...) described and refined his practice of meditation; it gathered urgent importance as he neared death. Augustine’s lifelong search for “God and the soul,” articulated in his first writings, evolved through his meditation, changing from an intellectual effort to achieve a vision of God by the use of reason to a search for the truth of his own life. In meditation he sought to recall in detail God’s loving leading within the chaos and pain of his youthful desires and throughout his life. I explore his understanding of “God is love” from his earliest (extant) treatise, De beata uita (386 CE), his Easter sermons on First John (415 CE), to his Enchiridion (421 CE) as the core of his developing understanding of God’s activity in himself. (shrink)

Emerson once referred to Swedenborg as “one of the missouriums and mastodons of literature.” These terms could with far more truth and less banality be applied to St. Augustine. His thought is overwhelming, as is the amount of literature he has generated. A wealth of studies has been published in the past half-century, some of exceptional value such as those of Peter Brown, John O’Meara, Jean Pepin, and Eugene Portalie.